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Abstract— We consider the problem of synthesizing safe
and robust controllers for real world robotic systems like
autonomous vehicles, which rely on complex perception mod-
ules. We propose a counterexample-guided synthesis framework
which iteratively learns perception models that enable finding
safe control policies. We use counterexamples to extract infor-
mation relevant for modeling the errors in perception modules.
Such models then can be used to synthesize controllers robust
to errors in perception. If the resulting policy is not safe,
we gather new counterexamples. By repeating the process, we
eventually find a controller which can keep the system safe
even when there is perception failure. Finally, we show that
our framework computes robust controllers for autonomous
vehicles in two different simulated scenarios: (i) lane keeping,
and (ii) automatic braking.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in perception algorithms have enabled
robotics and control research to focus on the development of
complicated systems such as autonomous vehicles, and surgi-
cal robots, which critically rely on perception modules. How-
ever, for such safety-critical applications, we need to ensure
safety for the closed-loop system. While machine learning
(ML)-based perception systems have shown to be effective
on average, their use in such systems can be dangerous and
cause unexpected results. Hence, it is important to design
controllers which are robust to errors produced by perception
modules. In this work, we focus on autonomous systems
(such as autonomous vehicles, AVs) that rely on ML-based
perception modules to sense and understand the environment.
Standard approaches for designing controllers for au-
tonomous vehicles decompose the the design problem into
(i) designing the perception system, and (ii) controller syn-
thesis. In theory, by imposing assumptions and guarantees on
each component, we can design them independently. Hence,
perception design is usually studied in isolation where the
focus is on improving local robustness [11], [10], [9], [22].
However, the proliferation of literature on adversarial attacks
(see, e.g. [7]) and verification of ML-based cyber-physical
systems (e.g. [2], [5]) shows us that state of the art ML-
based perception systems are still prone to errors. Therefore,
there is a need to design the control component of the system
so as to compensate for perception errors and keep the
autonomous system safe. In this work, we tackle this problem
using a counterexample-guided inductive synthesis technique
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Fig. 1: Webots TM for design and analysis of AVs.
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Fig. 2: Overview of our framework.
which iteratively learns a model of perception modules and
uses the model for control synthesis.
Our framework focuses on synthesizing simple models of
perception modules which can be used for control design.
In this work, we consider simulation environments (such as
WebotsTM, see Fig. 1) to study the autonomous agent in a va-
riety of environments. We use the simulator to generate data
which is used to learn models of perception modules. These
models are then employed to synthesize controllers which are
verified to be robust with respect to errors in perception, us-
ing state of the art simulation-based verification techniques.
Our framework is shown in Fig. 2. The challenge is to
find robust controllers without an explicit white-box analysis
of perception modules, which can be very expensive, at
best, and impossible, at worst, due to the lack of formal
specification for perception. Our approach overcomes this
by using inductive synthesis to infer a perception model in
counterexample-guided loop. We begin with an arbitrary con-
troller. The verifier then uses simulation-based verification
to execute the controller in different environments, until it
finds environments where the behavior is unsafe, which are
marked as counterexamples. These counterexamples are sent
to the synthesizer. The synthesizer uses them to generate a
perception model and uses the model for designing a new
candidate controller. This process repeats till a controller
is found that is verifiably robust to perception errors, or
terminates when no such controller can be found.
Various options are possible for the perception model,
including using ML models such as neural networks. We
take a simpler approach where a perception model maps each
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output y generated by the actual perception component to a
set of possible true values that could correspond to y. This
perception model is inferred from data using unsupervised
techniques such as clustering. This approach stands in
contrast with approaches such as counterexample-guided
data augmentation [4] which directly seeks to improve
the accuracy of perception modules. Instead of improving
perception modules in isolation, we use counterexamples to
directly improve the controller robustness. Our experience
is that this approach leads to improvement in the overall
system safety while using small amount of data.
We build upon existing work on automatically find-
ing counterexamples through simulation-driven falsification
(e.g., [3]). Using counterexamples, the framework identifies
a diverse set of behaviors and systematically refines the
perception model using those behaviors. And finally it uses
the perception model for control synthesis, yielding a fully
automated synthesis procedure.
To summarize our key contributions are,
• a novel counterexample-guided method to synthesize
controllers robust to perception errors;
• data-driven inference of simple models of complex per-
ception modules, including ML-based perception, and
• two case studies from the domain of autonomous
driving: (i) lane-keeping with a classical vision-based
perception module, and (ii) automatic braking with a
neural network-based perception module, demonstrating
that our framework is general enough to handle both
ML-based and non ML-based perception modules.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We are interested in synthesizing closed-loop controllers
which are robust to perception errors for autonomous agents
in simulation. The autonomous agent (ego) interacts with
the external environment, and is controlled by the controller.
Hence, the closed loop system comprises (1) the simulation
environment E which is made of the ego agent (also known as
the plant) and external environment wherein it operates; and
(2) the controller pi. The state of the simulator is defined by
xS ∈ XS . The controller does not have direct access to the
simulator state, but relies on a perception module to extract
information y ∈ Y , and computes the control input u ∈ U .
In our work, the controller is described with a finite set of
parameters p ∈ P . While our framework is applicable to
non-deterministic simulators, for simplicity here we consider
deterministic simulators. A schematic view of the closed-
loop system is shown in Fig. 3a. In the following paragraphs,
we formally define each component.
Definition 1 (Simulator): A simulator is a tuple
E(fS , hS , X0S) where fS : XS×U → XS defines the transi-
tion function, and hS : XS → Y is the output or perception
function. X0S ⊆ XS is the set of possible initial states.
Remark 1: The output function hS has two parts. The
first is the renderer which given a state of the simulator
produces the associated sensor readings e.g., image, point
cloud. These sensor readings are sent to the perception
modules which provide a state estimation required by the
controller pi. However, we consider the composition of the
renderer and perception modules as the perception function.
Running Example: Consider an Autonomous Vehicle
(AV) maintaining its lane in the simulator. The AV’s percep-
tion unit has (a) a camera that is mounted in front of the AV,
to estimate its position with respect to the center of the lane
it is following, and (b) a compass along with an imprecise
GPS which can estimate orientation of the AV w.r.t. the road.
Estimations are sent to a feedback controller which tries to
minimizes distance between the car and the lane center by
steering the AV. In this setting, the state of the simulation xS
includes (i) state of the AV —position, orientation and speed
of the AV, and (ii) potentially time-varying environment pa-
rameters such as time of the day, and AV’s target lane on the
map. Given a state of the simulator xS , the simulator renders
the image seen by the AV’s camera. The perception unit pro-
cesses this image to estimate the distance to the lane center.
Similarly GPS and compass readings are used to measure the
AV’s relative orientation. These processed information (y) is
fed to the feedback controller to compute the steering (u).
Definition 2 (Controller): A controller or the control pol-
icy is deterministic and defined as pi : P × Y → U .
Trajectories or traces of the closed-loop system are defined
by ξS : (xS(·),y(·),u(·)), wherein, for a given p ∈ P , initial
state xS(0) ∈ X0S , and all times (∀i ∈ N ):
y(i) = hS(xS(i))
u(i) = pi(p,y(i))
xS(i+ 1) = fS(u(i),xS(i)) .
In this work, we focus on finite-horizon safety properties.
Formally, given a time-varying safe set SS : N → 2XS , a
safety specification ϕS simply requires xS(i) ∈ SS(i) for all
i < H and a finite horizon H . Ultimately, we would like the
controller to safely control the ego agent in all environments.
X0S could be used to encode all environment assumptions
along with the initial state of the plant.
Running Example: In our lane-keeping example, we
wish to enforce all scenarios to happen in the morning.
Such environment assumption can be enforced by defining a
proper X0S as xS includes time of the day.
We assume we have access to internal state of the simu-
lator and we can initialize the environment in the simulator
to enforce the environment assumptions. Moreover, we can
modify the control policy by modifying the control param-
eters p ∈ P . We refer to such a control policy pi without
fixed parameters as parameterized policy.
Definition 3 (Control Synthesis): Given a simulator E , a
specification ϕS , and a parameterized policy pi, find a p s.t.
all traces ξS of the closed loop system are safe.
Model: Synthesizing a controller for the closed-loop sys-
tem can be quite challenging, and to manage the complexity
of the simulator, we wish to have a simple model (abstrac-
tion) for the simulator. Abstraction of dynamical system has
been studied rigorously for correct-by-construction control
design [21]. Abstraction of learning-enabled systems such
as neural network has been studied but not for perception
E
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(b) model in the loop
Fig. 3: Schematic view of closed-loop systems.
units [16], [1]. In this work, we wish to come up with simple
models of perception units to simplify control design process.
We emphasize that we are not interested in a general purpose
models, but models tailored specifically for control synthesis.
We define xM ∈ XM to be state of the model that
includes the relevant information required for synthesizing
a controller for E . We assume the model state xM can be
efficiently computed from a simulator state xS , i.e., there
exists a transfer function α that can map every state xS to
its corresponding model state xM (α : XS → XM ). Similar
to the simulator, we define a transition relation (fM ) which
models the dynamics and an output or perception relation
(hM ) which captures imperfect perception.
Definition 4 (Model): A model is a tuple
M(fM , hM , X0M ), where fM : XM × U → 2XM ,
hM : XM → 2Y , and X0M is the initial set of states.
Similar to traces for a simulator, a trace of the closed-
loop system for a model (Fig. 3b) is shown with ξM , which
defined similar to ξS , but contains xM (·) instead of xS(·),
where for a given xM (0) ∈ X0M
xM (i+ 1) ∈ fM (xM (i),u(i)) , y(i) ∈ hM (xM (i)) .
Relation hM defines possible values of output for a given
xM , and fM defines possible values of the next state.
Moreover, for a finite-horizon safety specification ϕS , we
define a specification ϕM s.t. (∀i ≤ H) x(i) ∈ SM (i) where
SM (i) is the projection of SS(i) into XM .
Definition 5 (Control Synthesis for Model): Given a
model M, a specification ϕM , and a parameterized policy
pi, find a p s.t. traces ξM of the closed-loop system are safe.
Goal of Modeling: The ultimate goal is to design a con-
troller for the model while providing formal guarantees for
the simulator. To achieve this goal, the model needs the abil-
ity to generate all possible behaviors that could be generated
by the simulator [21]. Then, a solution to control synthesis
problem for model M is a solution to the original problem.
Now, we elaborate on the differences between XS , Y , and
XM . xS is the true state of the simulator, and y represents
the measured information that is used for the decision
process in realtime. While XS and Y are given as part of the
problem, XM defines the level of abstraction we wish to use
to design pi. Success in the control synthesis phase depends
on the level of abstraction that is used in the model. The con-
trol synthesis problem becomes infeasible (has no solution) if
we use a coarse abstraction. On the other hand, using refined
abstractions increases complexity and makes control synthe-
sis problem harder to solve. Intuitively, we should rely on a
modelM that captures only essential factors required for the
control design process. Moreover, xM may have information
not only related to dynamics, but also information needed to
model the perception units (e.g. environment weather).
Running Example: Returning to the lane-keeping exam-
ple, a typical model for the AV can capture (a) relative
orientation of the AV w.r.t. the target lane, (b) relative
deviation from the center of the target lane, (c) speed of
AV. Here, instead of absolute position stored in xS , xM only
stores relative position and other information in xS including
the target lane on the map is ignored. We also note that, a
more complicated model can include environmental features
like time of the day as well.
In this work, we assume domain XM , along with α, X0M ,
and ϕM are given by an expert. To complete our model,
we need to define fM and hM . As we focus on modeling
perception units in this work, for simplicity we assume a
transition relation fM that can mimic fS is provided by an
expert using a system identification process:
x′S = fS(xS ,u) =⇒ α(x′S) ∈ fM (α(xS),u) .
This ensures transitions produced by the simulator is pro-
ducible by the model as well. Hence, the only missing part
of the model is hM .
III. PERCEPTION MODEL AND CONTROL SYNTHESIS
In order to complete the model we need to find a
perception relation hM , which is a challenging problem
if we want to ensure the model can capture all possible
behavior of the simulator. We take a learning-based approach
to build models for simulation environments. While this
procedure seems similar to model identification [12], there
are slight differences. Data-driven methods typically provide
formal guarantees only when we consider some assumption
about the data distribution (e.g. Gaussian processes [17], or
piecewise affine approximations [19]) or if the size of dataset
gets large enough (e.g. PAC learning [14]). In contrast, we
exploit the fact that we have access to a simulator, i.e., an
oracle providing data. This allows us to employ simulation-
based verification to search for counterexamples, which can
be used to augment the data set.
It is worth mentioning that hS may be significantly com-
plicated or may not be available in a closed-form. We only
need mathematical representation of hS if the verifier we
use to test the system relies on that. Otherwise, we consider
hS to be black-box functions, which allows a larger set of
simulators to be used within our framework.
The data set is simply a set of traces Ξ∗. The idea is to
learn a model s.t. when a trace in Ξ∗ is mapped into the
model trace, it could be generated with the model as well.
Formally, given data Ξ∗, the goal is to learn hM s.t.
(∀ξS ∈ Ξ∗) (∀i ≤ H) y(i) ∈ hM (α(xS(i))) . (1)
This constraint allows us to argue that as the dataset enlarges
and covers more behaviors, the model improves and under
some mild assumptions in the limit the learned model is
completely capable of mimicking the simulator. However, it
is not practical to gather a huge amount of data covering all
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Fig. 4: Inductive learning of models for control design.
possible behaviors. We argue that we need carefully selected
data points, where the selection criteria should be determined
during the control design process. Inspired by recent work on
counterexample-guided data augmentation [4], the key idea
here is to aggregate data iteratively in a counterexample-
guided loop. At each iteration we determine what types of
data are required to improve the model. This iterative data
collection allows us to learn a model which is carefully
crafted for control synthesis purposes.
Now, we sketch the overall inductive learning approach.
The procedure is iterative and at each iteration we update the
model by gathering more data. We start with initial model.
Then, at each iteration the following steps are performed:
1) Can we use the model M and synthesize a controller?
a) If yes, let pi s.t. all ξM satisfy ϕM .
b) Otherwise, declare failure.
2) Check whether all ξS satisfy ϕS?
a) If yes, Done.
b) Otherwise, add counterexamples to Ξ∗.
3) Learn a new model M from dataset Ξ∗.
Starting with an initial model, at each iteration, we design
a controller using the model. Having a controller for the
model, if the model can generate all behaviors of the simu-
lator, then it is guaranteed that all traces of the simulator ξS
satisfy safety. Therefore, we check if the controller is gener-
ating acceptable behavior for the original system. If not, we
conclude that the model needs improvement. In that case, un-
safe behaviors provide us new data and we learn a new model
(with the initial model as the prior) that can mimic the whole
dataset. As the dataset gets bigger in each iteration, the model
improves until it is able to completely capture all behaviors
of the simulator. The overall procedure is depicted in Fig. 4.
We argue that this iterative process can help us to find
good models specifically designed for the synthesis problem.
Comparing with a simple approach in which a huge amount
of data is generated randomly to learn a relatively accurate
model, our solution has several benefits. First, the data is
generated adversarially by a verifier. This allows to gather
critical data points that may not occur in a statistically
generated dataset. Second, our approach in practice does not
generate huge amount of data as data is generated iteratively
only when it is needed. Third, instead of directly testing
the learned model we test the overall system. This has two
benefits: (i) we can stop the process even if the model is
not accurate, but the system-level requirement is met. (ii)
we generate only data points wherein wrong models can
potentially lead to unsafe behaviors. As such, the model gets
more accurate only in regions wherein safety is relevant.
IV. AN INSTANTIATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Our framework has three main components: (a) a control
synthesizer, (b) a system verifier, and (c) a model generator.
In this section, we develop an instance of our framework and
describe how each component is implemented.
We start with an initial model M∗, and in each iteration,
we first solve a control synthesis problem using the model.
a) Control Synthesis: Any control synthesis routine
could be integrated inside our framework, and the com-
plexity/completeness of synthesis procedure depends on the
controller structure and the perception model. Aiming for
generality, here we use a variant of gradient-based methods
with random initialization to search for parameters p which
yield a robust policy w.r.t. the uncertainties in the model.
This synthesizer uses CEGIS [20] and iteratively synthesizes
a candidate policy and tests it over the model.
b) System Verifier: Once a policy pi is obtained, we
need to verify that the policy is safe for the simulator as well.
For this purpose, we use a falsification procedure to find
counterexamples. As active sampling-based methods have
been shown to be effective in falsifying black-box closed-
loop systems [6], we employ VerifAI, a recently developed
toolbox for analysis of AI-based systems, to implement
this sub-procedure [3]. More specifically, we use Bayesian
optimization for each safety property to find counterexam-
ples. If the verifier can not find a counterexample for the
synthesized controller pi within a fixed number of iterations,
we declare success. Or else, we use the counterexamples to
refine (improve) our model.
c) Model Generator: We learn a new model M from
data set Ξ∗ (counterexamples) that satisfies Eq. (1). In each
iteration, we use the generated counterexamples to improve
the model. In the rest of section, we describe a model
generation procedure we propose.
As mentioned, transition relations fM are derived from
laws of physics with simple models for uncertainties [12].
We argue such approach is not suitable for modeling systems
with perception modules. In particular, perception compo-
nents are hard to decompose into smaller systems and reason
over in a compositional way. Moreover, instead of laws
of physics, perception modules are generally artifacts of
machine learning or complex vision-based algorithms.
A natural way to define hM is to use an initial guess h∗M
with an addition of some errors. We model perception errors
with state dependent error functions:
yi ∈ hM,i(xM ) = {h∗M,i(xM )} ⊕ Ei(xM ) ,
where Ei : XM → 2R. Intuitively speaking, error of
measuring ith component of y does not directly depend on
other measurement, but depends only on the state.
Next, we investigate an unsupervised learning technique
for modeling Ei. Our approach is to cluster the datapoints
and learn a local model for each cluster. Recall that we wish
yi
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Fig. 5: Modeling perception relation with clustering.
to use counterexamples to learn the model. These coun-
terexamples may be ad-hoc because (i) errors in learning-
enabled components are ad-hoc, and (ii) counterexamples
reveal different types of errors in the closed-loop system.
The clusters helps to better model errors for regions in which
perception may not be accurate. In fact, clustering methods
has been used for analysis of perception components in [15],
but not in the context of control design.
Initially datapoints (xS , yi) are extracted from Ξ∗ and
is then projected into XM : (xM = α(xS), yi). Next,
we use standard clustering algorithms such as KMeans
or Gaussian Mixture Models to partition the dataset into
different clusters [18]. Let {(xkM , yki )}k∈Kj be data points
in the jth cluster. For simplicity we define domain of jth
cluster to be the smallest box containing {xkM}k∈Kj and
Rj(xM ) : [lowj(xM ), upj(xM )] ⊆ Yi defines the error
range for that cluster. Next we use a linear model for lowj ;
i.e. lowj(xM ) = AxM + B. We solve for A and B using
linear programming such that AxkM + B ≤ yki (∀k ∈ Kj).
Similiar procedure is used for upj .
Notice that clustering is performed in domain XM × Yi,
but domain of each cluster is defined over XM . As depicted
in Fig. 5, a given xM can belong to multiple clusters. To
obtain a model we define Ei as follows:
Ei(xM ) =
{
{0} xM 6∈
⋃
j Dj⋃
{j |xM∈Dj}Rj(xM ) otherwise .
If xM does not belong to any cluster, we assume the error is
zero. Otherwise, we consider the ranges for all clusters with
xM in their domain to guarantee Eq. (1) holds for M.
V. EXPERIMENTS
For our experiments, we consider two case studies for AVs
with faulty perception units. While we use Webots TM [13],
our technique can be used with many other simulators.
A. Case Study I – Lane Keeping
In this case study, we consider our running example, the
lane keeping on straight roads. The AV can accurately esti-
mate its orientation θAV using a compass and the orientation
of the road θR using an HD map and an imprecise GPS.
However, to estimate the deviation from the lane center d
it relies on a camera. The image taken by the camera is
processed to detect lane boundaries [8] and a regression pro-
cess is used to learn a model for estimating deviation using
detected boundaries. However, this deviation estimation is
not always reliable as it involves image processing and ML.
Fig. 6: Data extracted from counterexamples for lane-
keeping. Points with same colors belong to same clusters.
The steering policy is simply a linear feedback law w.r.t.
relative orientation θ∆ : θAV − θR and deviation; pi :
p1θ∆ + p2 d. For the requirements, we assume initially
d ∈ [−0.4, 0.4]m and θ∆ ∈ [−0.25, 0.25] radian. Also, the
speed is initially in range [15, 25]kph. The goal is to keep
the deviation in range [−1, 1] and get to {(θ∆, d) | θ∆ ∈
[−0.1, 0.1], d ∈ [−0.3, 0.3]} in 4 seconds. Recall that the
model state xM includes (a) deviation d, (b) relative orienta-
tion θ∆, and speed v and perception output is measured state
(yt : [vˆ, θˆ∆, dˆ]). Since we assume measurements of speed
v, and orientations θAV and θR are accurate, hM,1(xM ) =
v, hM,2(xM ) = θ∆. We only model hM,3 which is defined
over d, θ∆, and v and provides a range for dˆ. However, the
speed of AV does not affect measurement of d as we rely on
a single image to estimate d. Thus, for simplicity we model
hM,3 as a map from d and θ∆ to range of possible dˆ.
Starting from a model that has a perfect perception, the
control synthesis procedure yields parameters p1 = −0.5,
p2 = −0.8, and many uniformly random generated simu-
lations confirm that the property holds. However, VerifAI
could find a set of corner case counterexamples. Next,
these counterexamples are used to improve the model for
perception and the process continues. After a couple of
iterations, the procedure terminates successfully. Set of data
points extracted from counterexamples are shown in Fig. 6.
The figure shows error on dˆ as a function of d and θ∆. As
depicted, when d and θ∆ are close to origin, the error is
small and the error gets unpredictably large in other places.
Using this data extracted from only 11 counterexample
traces we find that parameters p1 = −3.93 and p2 = −0.63
yield a robust system and even VerifAI can not find coun-
terexamples. Intuitively, because the error in measurement of
d is relatively large compared to θ∆, the feedback law p1θ∆+
p2 d is safe only when |p2| is relatively smaller than |p1|.
B. Case Study II – Automatic Braking System
We consider scenarios in which the AV detects construc-
tion cones on the road and brakes. More precisely in these
scenarios two lanes are blocked by a broken car and cones
are used to warn drivers. The AV uses a camera and a
Fig. 7: Automatic braking scenario.
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Fig. 8: Automatic braking policy.
trained neural network to detect cones. While the simulation
environment can have many variations, including: color of
the broken car, orientation of the broken car and speed of the
traffic (all environment vehicles have same constant speed),
the model only includes distance to the cones d and speed
of the AV v: d˙ = −v, v˙ = u (where 0 ≤ u ≤ 2.5).
A straightforward solution for designing a controller is to
brake as soon as possible to guarantee safety. While this is
the best strategy when the distance to the cones d is small, it
reduces passenger comfort and increases chance of accident
when there is a car behind the AV. To avoid such behavior
we consider another car that moves behind the AV with the
same speed and has a full knowledge about the cone and
brakes in an optimal way. Then, we require the AV to stop
while avoiding a crash with the car behind.
We wish to design a braking control system that uses
estimated distance to the cone. Having the distance and speed
of AV one could use laws of physics to find the minimum
force needed for the brake. In the perception unit, the neural
network not only detects cones, but also provides a bounding
box around detected cones. We wish to use size of these
bounding boxes to estimate the distance. However, such mea-
surement is not reliable especially when the distance is large.
To design a safe controller we consider the following policy.
The controller assumes measured distance dˆ is reliable only
when dˆ ≤ p1 and in that case it provides an optimal force:
vˆ2
2dˆ
, where vˆ is the measured speed. However, when dˆ > p1,
the controller just reduces the speed to p2m/s (u = p2 − vˆ)
after detecting cones and ignores value of dˆ for feedback
calculation. Fig. 8 shows a qualitative trace of the system.
Recall that xM contains only d and v and output y
includes estimated value of d (dˆ) and v (vˆ). We assume vˆ = v
and since dˆ is independent of v, hM,2 only maps d to range
of possible dˆ. We also set dˆ to infinity if no cone is detected.
Finding parameters for the policy is not a trivial task as these
parameters heavily depend on the measurement errors and
d
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inf
upper-bound on possible values
lower-bound on possible values
infinite is a possible value
dˆ = p1
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dˆ = d
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Fig. 9: Modeling NN-based perception. Inf means the cone
could not be detected. Top: clustered data obtained from
counterexamples. Bottom: the learned perception relation.
the dynamics of the agents. Initially, using a perfect per-
ception, there are many solutions and the synthesizer picks
p1 = 25 and p2 = 7.02 to start. However, VerifAI finds few
counterexamples. For these counterexamples, the distance is
measured to be less than 25, while the actual distance is very
larger, and the AV reduces speed quickly crashing with the
car behind it. Using counterexamples, we update the model.
In the next iteration only few counterexamples were found,
and in all of those cases, the color of the broken car is close
to the color of the cones. This suggest that the perception unit
behaves differently in these cases, causing AV to brake early
and collide with the car behind it. Again, by updating the
model, the policy synthesizer finds parameters p1 = 16.5 and
p2 = 7.6. In other words, the policy uses value of dˆ only if
dˆ < 16.5. This strategy allows to safely stop the car by mea-
suring the distance using neural networks. The final model
generated using 40 counterexamples is shown in Fig. 9. No-
tice that when d > 35.2, dˆ can be infinity (no cone detected).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we investigated problem of control synthesis
for a closed-loop system with faulty perception components.
Our method iteratively learns models for perception
components and then synthesizes controllers for those
models. At each iteration the method puts the designed
controller under test to prove its safety or alternatively
it finds counterexamples which are used to improve the
perception model. We demonstrate effectiveness of our
method for designing safe controllers for autonomous
vehicles which use ML-based perception components.
In the future we wish to work on other instantiations of our
framework. In particular we wish to investigate other meth-
ods for modeling perception components, and control syn-
thesis for those models. Moreover, co-design of control and
perception components is another direction worth exploring.
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